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M uslims in  Europe; A new Iden tity  for Islam  
By M ichael KING
SUMMARY
This paper arose out of ideas generated in the E.U.I. Workshop on 
M uslim Families in Europe which took place in October 1992. The 
presence in European countries of several million Muslims, most of 
whom have arrived during the last thirty years from countries where 
social life is organized in ways which accommodate Islam  as the 
predom inant, if the not the official state, religion raises serious 
questions of adaptation. W hat is considered here are two such 
processes of adaptation. The first is the way th a t the religion of 
Islam, when confronted with a secular social environment where the 
values of rationality and individualism prevail, is forced to produce 
social identities for its adherents which reduce in importance (or even 
deny) any notion of faith as offering a uniquely religious, spiritual 
experience. The production of the concept of 'The Muslim Family' is 
referred to as an example of this first process of secularization. 
Secondly, the paper dem onstrates how Islam is transform ed into 
something other than  religion when it enters into the semantic realm 
of and is reconstructed by other social systems, such as law, politics 
and health.
The paper draws upon sociological theories which emphasise both the 
evolutionary nature of society, the function of social systems and the 
processes through which knowledge and reality are constructed. It 
pays particular attention to the ideas of Niklas Luhmann as set out 
in his book, Funktion der Religion. These theoretical concepts are 




























































































M uslims in  Europe: A new  Iden tity  for Is lam 1 
By M ichael KING
The essence o f the Qur'anic and the prophetic teaching is 
based upon willingness to abandon the world and all 
attachment to it and, indeed, to experience 'death' before 
biological death. The Prophet said: "Die before you die", 
meaning transcend all sense and reason.
Shaykh Fadhlalla Haeri, The Elements o f Islam  (1992)
INTRODUCTION
The original idea of this paper on the complex subject of law and 
religious identity  arose from the papers and discussions a t the 
Workshop last October on M uslim Families in Europe, which I am 
now in the process of editing for publication2. While the Workshop 
was deliberately  narrow  in its scope and untheoretical in its 
approach, it did raise several difficult issues of a general nature 
concerning religious identity in modern W estern societies and the 
encounters betw een trad itio n al religions and m odern social 
institutions, such as law. In purely practical term s the very recent 
phenomenon of over five million Muslims moving to and settling in 
Europe has already caused serious problems for W estern liberalism 
as the ambivalent response to the Rushdie affair has demonstrated.
If one sees the encounter between Islam and the W est as a battle 
between two irreconcilable value systems, it is difficult to understand 
how Muslims would be able to exist as M uslims’ in Western countries 
without building an impenetrable wall around themselves and their 
beliefs. Indeed there appears to be a paradox in very existence of 
large num bers of people in Europe who, on the one hand, seem 
increasingly to prefer to emphasise the cultural/religious identity of 
Islam over national or linguistic identities and, on the other hand, 
seem able for the most part to integrate themselves successfully into 
European society. This should lead us to question the ra ther simple 
idea of 'two worlds' a t least as a model for analyzing w hat is 
happening to Muslims and Islam in Europe.
* I am especially grateful to the European Commission and lo the European Culture 
Research Centre at the EUI., Florence, whose generosity made this research 
possible. I should also like to thank Uli D’Oliveira, Emile Noël. Anton Schütz and 
Gunther Teubner for their suport and encouragement.





























































































The problem starts with the attempts by social theorists to construct a 
unitary, comprehensive notion of European or western Society and to 
juxtapose this with another unitary and comprehensive construction 
called, 'Islam'. This is not to say tha t these ’two worlds' do not exist, 
but ra ther th a t such an approach cannot account for the dynamic 
na tu re  of social institu tions and social relations and it is th is 
dynamism which is of vital importance if we are to understand what 
is happening to the Islamic identity. It is certainly true th a t modern 
western society is characterised by secularism with its emphasis on 
rationality, humanism, personal responsibility and individualism and 
th a t these attributes pervade all areas of social life, but w ithin this 
generalized philosophical frame exist several different social meaning 
systems all involved in interpreting, in making sense of the chaos or 
'noise' of the social world. In modern societies these meaning systems 
have developed into separate, functionally-specific institutions of, for 
example, science, economics, law, health, politics and religion. This 
is not simply a m atter of each explaining the social world in their own 
term s or their different perspectives on social phenomena. Rather 
each can be seen as constructing its own version of reality according 
to its own procedures for tru th  validation. This fragmented epistemic 
world of modern societies contrasts with traditional societies where a 
single version of tru th  and reality tends to pervade all areas of 
knowledge and where social divisions tend  to be based on 
stra tifica tion  such as race and class ra th e r  th an  functions 
[Luhmann,1986,p.5ffl
In this paper I first want to examine the idea of a distinct Muslim 
religious identity, which was claimed by several speakers a t the 
Florence Workshop and emerges in many of the contributions to the 
collection of Workshop papers. Let me take as my starting  point the 
contrast between the fixed and unchanging notion of Islam, as both 
a religious faith and a code of conduct covering almost every aspect of 
private and public life, th a t was presented by Abdel Hamid Chirane 
and M anazir Ahsan and by Lawrence Rosen's anticipation of the 
emergence of 'a distinctive European Muslim culture'. Both these 
positions have their resonances in the idea of an Islamic identity. On 
the one hand there is the traditionalist view which would accept as 
Muslims only those who had been brought up in the faith  or had 
openly recognized God's uniqueness and M ohamm ed as his 
messenger. It would reject as Muslim all those who had renounced 
or abandoned their faith or forfeited their right to be called 'Muslim' 
th rough m arrying a non-believer or living th e ir lives in clear 
contradiction of Muslim law. On the other, there exists a very 
different notion of a Muslim identity where Islam and 'being Muslim’ 
represent an aspect of 'self' for all those rational, free individuals 



























































































identity does not depend upon recognition by others or conformity to 
rules imposed by some external authority; it is ra the r something 
accepted and projected by the individual. Thus Muslim women who 
m arry non-Muslim men may continue to refer to them selves as 
Muslim and to expect others (except the most orthodox Muslims) to 
accept this part of their identity.
It was such ambivalences in the definitions of personal identity and 
social identity and the relations between the two th a t led me to re­
examine the idea of religious identity as a process of evolution 
undertaken by religion itself, ra ther than  as merely an artefact of 
individual or social discourses. That this evolutionary process is 
determ ined by the social environment (including people) in which 
and upon which religion has to operate is the major factor in deciding 
what identities religion produces for its adherents and for society and 
its sub-systems.
My paper traces th is quest for a way of understanding religious 
identity first by examining briefly the modern notion of identity, then 
by analyzing in much more detail the identity th a t religious systems 
construct for themselves in response to societal problems. I take the 
example of Islam, not because it is in any way unique among the 
world's religions, but because the abruptness of its transportation 
into modern W estern societies makes its evolution all the more 
dram atic and sudden and all the more interesting for students of 
religion and religious identity. The section headings are
Identity in the Modern World 
The social Identity of Religion 
The Evolution of the Religious Identity of Islam 
Religion in Modern Society 
Religion and the Family
The Construction of Religion as a Secular Identity 
Islam and Modern Law 
The Reconstruction of religion within Religion
IDENTITY IN THE M ODERN W ORLD
1. Generally, within modern, secular societies 'an identity' is seen as 
something which allows one to present oneself as a member of a 
socially recognized group, whether religious, cultural, national or 
political. It is often seen as an essential aspect of the social being. 
Having a consistent identity, a knowledge of who you are and where 
you stand in relation to different social groups has been seen on the 




























































































and integration within through the internalization of 'the other' and 
the in ternal representation of 'the self as seen by the other [Mead 
1934]. Moreover, the belief th a t others th ink and act like you, 
sharing your beliefs and attitudes also has a positive role to play in 
promoting self-confidence, self-awareness and self-fulfilment. A 
person without such a clear identity is often presented in modern 
W estern culture as l'étranger, the outsider, lacking any clear sense of 
'self, unattached to any social group, alienated from everyone and 
everything in the social world where he or she exists.
However, this is an important aspect of the modern notion of identity 
which contrasts markedly with traditional societies where identities 
were and are largely acquired through birth  (family, national and 
regional) and may be changed only in exceptional circumstances. In 
the modern world not only may they be selected by adults during 
their lifetime, but changing fundam ental aspects of the self one 
presents to the external worlds is quite common place. A person may, 
for example, change their name, chose to become the citizen of 
another country, undertake a religious conversion or a sex-change 
operation. Although there may be questions as to how 'real' such 
changes are, for all official purposes a person may insist upon his or 
her acquired iden tity  by, for example, dem anding righ ts  of 
citizenship or insisting tha t his/her children attend a religious school. 
Increasingly, a 'healthy society' is seen as one where individual 
rights are respected, including the right to make choices concerning 
the they w ant to be described by others, a t least in term s of 
nationality, religion and gender. In Anglo-Saxon countries th is 
freedom is even being extended to children, who may now, in certain 
circumstances, choose to change their family identity, th a t  is the 
family with whom they identify.
2. Conversely, identities which are imposed upon a person without 
his/her consent and form the basis for differentiation between people 
and for distributing resources are seen, as a denial of hum an rights. 
An 'unhealthy society’, such as existed in South Africa, therefore, is 
one which uses attribu ted  identity as a m eans of denying to 
individual the freedom to choose their self-identity. W here, those 
features of the individual which are immutable or extremely difficult 
to change, such as skin colour, certain physical features associated 
with ethnic or racial groups or gender are, selected for special 
a tten tion  by governm ents as defining the person, liberal and 
egalitarian political movements are likely to emerge demanding an 
end to such discrimination and stratification along racial or ethnic 




























































































3. In the modern world an individual may simultaneously have more 
than  one identity, provided tha t these identities are compatible and 
provide th a t person with both a coherent notion of a unified self and 
an a ttachm en t to one or more external group which are also 
compatible. Problems arise when the 'self is fractured into different 
belonging identities to the point where the individual does not know 
where he or she really belongs or who he or she really is. This is 
described as an ’identity conflict' or 'an identity crisis'. There are also 
dangers lu rk ing  where an person belongs to two or more 
incompatible groups giving rise to 'conflicts of loyalty'. Sometimes 
these two forms of conflict are seen as afflicting one heroic individual 
who is 'a t war with him or herself and at the same time being forced 
to betray one of the groups to which he or she belongs. These 
conflicts tend to excite considerable interest. T.E. Lawrence is an 
example of archetypal modern hero in conflict with himself, or rather 
with his two identities. After leading the Arab Revolt against the 
Turks in North Africa, while dressed as a Bedouin and for several 
years enduring a nomadic existence in the desert, Lawrence returned 
to England. There, he endured the betrayal of his Arab allies 
abandoned by the  B ritish  Government for reasons of political 
expediency. He also experienced a profound crisis of identity, when 
he discovered the Bedouin identity tha t he had chosen to adopt, had 
soured his belief in English society and its values. W hat makes 
Lawrence interesting from our perspective is not so much the way 
th a t his heroic exploits and subsequent re trea t from public life 
succeeded in capturing the imagination of many millions of people in 
the W estern world, but the fact tha t Lawrence saw himself and was 
portrayed by his several biographers as a man caught between two 
worlds.
... the effort for these years to live in the dress of Arabs and im itate 
their mental foundation, quitted me of my English self, and let me look 
a t the West and its conventions with new eyes: they destroyed it all for 
me. At the same time I could not sincerely take on the Arab skin: it 
was an affectation only. Easily was a man made an infidel, but hardly 
might he be converted to another faith. I had dropped one form and not 
taken the other ... (Lawrence, p.31-2)
Lawrence was seen as an individual caught in the 'no m an's land’ 
between two incompatible identities, two perm anent insurmountable 
barriers, which denied any possibility of movement either forward or 
backward. His subsequent attem pt to bury himself and his past by 
becoming Air craftsm an Shaw and Private Ross were seen the only 
escape route open to him. Yet there is also a sense in which the 
Lawrence story can be seen as a modern parable demonstrating the 
price to be paid when an individual steps beyond boundary of those 




























































































1920s the identity of an Englishman in an 'Arab skin' clearly was not 
acceptable, even as a transitional identity. It was only valid as a 
disguise, a false identity, taken on with the sole purpose of outwitting 
an enemy.
4. Although the psychological lite ra tu re  on social iden tity  has 
traditionally been concerned with the way th a t individuals  come to 
see themselves as belonging to specific social groups, more recently, 
both psychologists and sociologists have w ritten about the way in 
which people construct their own social worlds and themselves, their 
personal identity , w ithin th a t world. Yet th is  iden tity  is not 
constructed from thin air. There m ust be a sense in which it was its 
existence pre-dates any individual construction1. As Thomas 
Luckmann, one of the early exponents with Peter Berger of the 
constructivist school of the sociology of knowledge [Berger and 
Luckmann, 1967] explains,
Except for bodily functions, lusts, and pains, the individual does not 
experience him self directly; w hat he does experience directly is a 
structured and changing environment...
Personal iden tity  is in te r  subjective and has a s itu a tio n a l 
biographical dimension. [Luckmann, 1987 p.374]
Yet he then goes on to tell us how
...One of the most im portant characteristics in modern societies is 
the segm enting of the total structure into institu tional domains 
which are organized to m eet the m ain requirem ents of separate 
functions... This means th a t the norms of behaviour inherent in one 
system  a t any one tim e are not directly transferab le to other 
com ponent system s. The structures of m eaning belonging to 
different component systems are not related to personal identities 
but to institutions (p.376)
In modern societies social institutions are, according to Luckmann 
somehow failing in their responsibility of producing the conditions for 
the individual to construct a concept of'self th a t serves to situate him 
or her in the general social structure. As a result, people are seen as 
experiencing 'no common reality' and 'no socially produced stable 
social structure of personal identity', but are presented instead with 
several competing, incompatible meaning systems with no bridge 
between them  and no arch to frame them. According to Luckmann, 
what this means is th a t each person has to face up, in his or her own 
subjective and private way (p.379), to the task  of achieving for
1 Berger and Luckmann (1967) lell us that 'Identity is a phenomenon that 
emerges from the dialectic between individual and society', but that 'identity 



























































































him self and herself a 'stable, personal identity'. How we do this, 
according to Luckmann, is then a m atter of personal choice. The 
individual will receive little help in th a t choice from the social world 
which he or she lives and works, because modern institutions produce 
role-performers valid only within these systems of meaning ra ther 
th an  the cohesive and comprehensive notion of 'se lf th a t  were 
produced by traditional societies. On the other hand, it would appear 
th a t, according to th is account, individuals are free to choose 
w hatever identity pleases them  and, in doing so, are presum ably 
allowed to fulfil their own personal desires and ambitions and yet, 
the absence of a 'total social structure' makes the exercise of this 
freedom empty and meaningless exercise.1
5. How are we to reconcile these different versions of the identity 
problem? Is it really the case th a t modern society provides fixed 
points, beyond which individual identity cannot without being forced 
beyond the limits of what is socially acceptable? If this is so, how is it 
possible th a t  new identities are constantly being produced in the 
m odern world. F ar from being solid and fixed, the barriers  
surrounding individual choices of identity appear to be in continual 
sta te  of flux. Alternatively, are we to be left with Luckm ann's 
paradox of individuals who are free to 'be themselves' only to find 
th a t the selves th a t they construct have no general social validity 
and only serve- them  in narrow social situations. However, while 
Luckmann's paradoxical state might take us closer to the subjective 
experience of life as lived, is it really the case th a t modern societies 
provide no generalized identities leaving the confused individual 
with no solution but to find a good psychoanalyst to help him to find 
out who he/she really is or can become? For the purposes of this 
article I would not want to offer any definition of identity' other than 
th a t of self-image. Instead, I would suggest tha t we can speak of the 
existence of an individual identity wherever there is conceptual 
notion available which allows a person to place him or herself within 
the prevailing environment and to differentiate him or herself from 
th a t environment. A social identity for our purposes will exist when 
such a notion is generally recognized within a specific society.
Identity and Religious Experience
In my discussion of religion I s tart from the assumption th a t there 
exists a t  both the  sociological and psychological levels some 
experience which is essentially religious. This does not mean tha t the 
experience has necessarily to be associated with the existence of a
* I would lake issue with Luckmann's denial of any 'stable structure ol personal 
identity' by arguing that the social production of the notion of 'the individual' 




























































































superior being, but ra ther th a t it transcends rationality  and the 
'normal' range of feelings and provides individuals and groups of 
people with the sensation th a t they are engaged in a communion 
either with their own 'inner selves' or with some spirit or existence 
beyond the m aterial world in which they live out their everyday lives.
I am not saying th a t this experience is always interpreted socially in 
a conventionally religious way. As Aldous Huxley, Timothy Leary, 
Ronald Laing and many others have shown, it may be taken  as 
evidence of some spirit or force quite remote from m onotheistic 
religion. Nor does the experience have to be accessible only through 
such formally religious activities, as praying, fasting, chastity , 
witnessing miracles or, martyrdom. However, it has usually been 
religion which has been called upon to m ake sense of these 
transcendental or spiritual events and to give guidance on how 
experiences of 'oneness' and communion with the inner self or 
external being may be achieved by the individual. It has also been 
formal religious institutions which are called upon to decide whether 
contingent experiences of this nature are or are not 'genuine'1.
The acceptance by societies of the existence of religious experience is 
absolutely central to the development of religious dogmatics as is the 
notion th a t this experience can only be achieved by following certain 
accepted paths. If this were not the case, then religion would have 
no separate social identity; it would not be able to differentiate itself 
from law, morality, politics, economics etc. For religious individuals 
and organizations, which inevitably engage in legal, moral, political 
and economic activities, it is only the unquestioning acceptance of 
religious experience, the use of fa ith  as the u ltim ate legitim ator, 
which allows them  to claim that their involvement in these activities 
is indeed ’religious'.
For M uslims the very meaning of the word, 'Islam ', subm ission  
reminds them  of the fundamental importance of faith. The verses of 
the Koran abound with references to the necessity of acceptance of 
God and God's word without doubts and without questioning and to 
the fate th a t awaits those who tu rn  their back on an unwavering 
belief in God2-
From the perspective of the sociology of social identity production 
w hat is particularly  interesting is the guidance given in Islamic
1 Bernard Shaw's play St. Joan offers an interesting debate on the legitimation of 
religious experience. Ultimately it is the Catholic Church, and not the pragmatic 
English army, which has formally to declare Joan's voices to be false.




























































































scriptures and commentaries for Muslims to achieve a state  of self- 
knowledge and purity  of heart which denotes religious perfection 
th a t brings the individual to sim ultaneous communion with the 
inner-self and the universe. As the quotation at the s ta r t of this 
article indicates, what this requires is a total denial of oneself as an 
individual, a merging of oneself with the universe, a death before 
biological death, the absence of any differentiation between the self 
and the environment.
T H E  SOCIAL IDENTITY OF RELIG IO N
According to anthropological studies, in traditional societies it was 
religion which both provided the individual with a generalized 
identity and also limited severely the identities which anyone could 
leg itim ately  adopt [Mol,1976]!. As one m ight expect social 
psychologists have tended to tu rn  this round by presenting religion 
as answering certain hum an needs relating to peoples fears and 
uncertainties and the need to account for inexplicable events (See e.g. 
Batson, 1982). A number of sociologists, also influenced by both 
these lines of enquiry have transferred this notion of need from the 
individual to society by examining the functions religion plays 
through ritua l, p rayer etc. in structuring  people's lives and in 
legitim ating certain forms of behaviour, usually associated with the 
exercise of power [Weber,1963; Beckford,1982]. Others, such as 
D urkheim , have em phasised the cohesive force of religion for 
individuals as well as for societies (See Pickering, 1984) or the fit or 
non-fit between different religions and the needs of capitalist societies 
[Weber,1963]. Yet none of these approaches has been able to arrive 
a t a concept of religious identity which reconciles in a satisfactory 
m anner any notion of the evolution of religion in different social 
environments or any description of the ways in which the meaning of 
religious identity may be transformed by the social system and social 
subsystems which it encounters.
One way to deal with this problem of religious identity is to change 
the orientation of the problematic away from the predicament of the 
individual. This is precisely what Niklas Luhmann did when in his 
book, Funktion der Religion [Luhmann, 1984], he examined the 
issue of religious identity. Luhmann refuses to accept the concept of 
the individual, th a t transcendental subject of post-Enlightenment 
Europe, as the sta rting  point for sociological enquiry. He sees 
identity as a problem not so much for the individual as for evolving





























































































societies and social sub-systems. The identity problem for religion as 
a social subsystem concerns, for example, how to differentiate itself 
from other social subsystems and a social environment which is in a 
continual sta te  of change, while a t the same tim e influencing the 
environment in ways tha t will ensure its own survival and continued 
influence. The processes which evolve within religious organizations 
to solve these problem will decide what form religions and religious 
identities take in different societies. This in turn  will determine what 
possibilities are open for people living in th a t society to situate 'the 
self and in terpret their own behaviour and the behaviour of others. 
In the rem ainder of this piece I shall attem pt to trace Luhm ann's 
ideas and to apply them to Islam and the identity problems it faces as 
a social subsystem in the modern world. By approaching the issue in 
th is  way it should be possible to throw  some ligh t on the 
contradictions th a t seem to be implicit in the notion of a European 
Islam and more generally in the concept of a secularized religious 
identity.
Religion as a Social System of Communications
1. In order to understand Luhmann's ideas on religious identity, it is 
necessary to examine briefly some of the concepts essential to his 
general theoretical approach to the social evolution of systems. In the 
first place Luhmann sees society, not as a collection of hum an beings, 
but as communicative acts and social systems. They are, therefore, 
systems consisting, not of people, but of communications. Individuals 
have their separate existence as psychic or personal systems, but for 
social systems they are part of the environment in which the system 
operates and which it attem pts to influence by its communications. 
Since systems can consist only of communications through which 
meaning is generated, people affect systems only to the extent th a t 
their communications (utterances, acts, writings etc.) take place 
within and are thus interpreted by these diverse meaning systems. 
Each of these system s is involved in a continuous process of 
in terp reting  or reconstructing the social environm ent (including 
society and all its subsystems) in ways which make sense on its own 
terms.
As a general rule, the success or failure of systems in differentiating 
themselves from their environment is crucial to the systems survival. 
This is achieved through the process of reduction of complexity by 
selectivity. The environment is always more complex th a t the system, 
giving rise to infinite possibilities for interpretation. Any particular 
subsystem , in order to produce and reproduce its own world of 
meaning, m ust select from the environment those inputs which it 




























































































complex, so each sub-system is obliged to respond by producing more 
(or less) complex reconstructions of that society
This imposition of selective meanings of society w ithin different 
subsystems occurs through a process of binary coding, for example, 
lawful/unlawful for law, power/no power for politics, profit/loss for 
economics, sick/healthy for health  systems, true/false for science. 
M eaning is produced through the affirm ation or negation of 
s ta tem en ts  using th is  binary code. The fact th a t  in  any 
communicative exchange is accepted as offering the possibility of an 
affirm ation or a negation of a proposition as a basis for fu rther 
in terac tion  binds fu ture exchanges to a p articu la r system  of 
interpretation. By producing meaning for themselves and for their 
environm ent social systems are able simultaneously to evolve an 
autonomous existence and to guarantee their future w ithin their 
social environment. For Luhmann, therefore, it does not make any 
sociological sense to examine a religion except in the context of the 
social environment in which it exists. 'One cannot select an identity 
for a system  w ithout a t the same tim e selecting a relevant 
environment and vice versa' [Luhmann, 1984, p.48].
The in troduction of writing, and la te r printing, expanded the 
possibilities for communication beyond face to face interaction and 
resulted in the development of additional code mechanisms which 
Luhm ann calls symbolically generalized communications media. 
These allow the transmission of systems-generated meanings across 
a wide variety of situations and for many different communications. 
They include love, tru th , power, and faith.
An im portant aspect of social meaning systems is their self-referential 
nature. Because the code used by each system reconstructs the 
environm ent is unique, relating as it does to the system 's social 
function, all communications taking place within the system must 
refer back to previous communications of th a t system. Systems, 
therefore, reproduce themselves from their own elements. Moreover 
communications cannot pass directly from one system to another. 
Systems may of course interpret (reconstruct) the same social event 
in their own particular ways, but any communications between them 
concerning this event m ust take the form of an interference, th a t is, 
of one system reconstructing the other's communications in its own 
terms.
2. Applying this general theory specifically to religion as a social 
system , the  ta sk  of religion is then  to construct the social 
environment in religious terms, providing its own interpretation of 




























































































tra n s la to r  of one of the chapters of Luhm ann's F unktion  der 
Religion, - Religiose Dogmatik und gesellschaft Evolution - writes in 
his explanatory introduction,
It is not simply a question of accommodation by religion to modern 
society; i t  is also a question of reform ulating  the com plete 
system/environment relation from the perspective of religion [Beyer,
1984, p.xix]
Religion, therefore, cannot produce anything other th an  religious 
communications, and is programmed to reconstruct legal, political, 
scientific etc. communications in religious terms. This does not mean, 
of course, th a t every time a religious cleric speaks, he or she is 
u tte ring  a religious communication or th a t religious leaders or 
organizations never become involved in political or economic m atters. 
Indeed, religious organizations and leaders may apply the linguistic 
codes of other social systems to themselves and their own operations. 
This, as we shall see, is one aspect of secularization.
3. Social theorists who wish to understand religion as a social system 
m ust not simply reduce it to the state of a superstition or a collection 
of rituals; they need to examine it on its own terms, i.e. as religion. In 
the same way, they should not proceed by imposing sociological, 
psychological or political definitions upon it, since to do so is to deny 
the existence of religion as having meaning for itself. Much of 
Luhm ann's account, then, is concerned with the problems faced by 
religious systems, notably Christianity, in differentiating itself from 
the environm ent of modern societies and in reconstructing th is 
environment in terms which simultaneously make sense for religion 
and allow religion to influence th a t environment in ways th a t will 
ensure its own reproduction. Indeed, much of Luhmann's analysis is 
almost theological in its concern to understand such controversial 
issues as the evidence for God's existence and the  validity  of 
revelationary claims.
4. At the same time, it is not sufficient for social theorists to confine 
their analysis to the theological level. They m ust be simultaneously 
aware of the systemic nature of religion and of the functions it 
performs for society. Although Luhm ann is unwilling to lim it 
religion’s functions by describing them  in any com prehensive 
m anner, he deals specifically with one particular function; th is is to 
relieve society of its contingency problems caused in particular by 
disappointm ents and unfulfilled expectations by ’m anaging the 
inevitability of contingency' [Beyer, 1984, p.xxxxiv]1. Contingencies
1 A recent example would be Sadam Hussein’s use of the idea that Iraq was 




























































































give rise to a wide range of possible explanations including those tha t 
may be damaging to the continuance of the social system. Although 
relig ion  m ay not alw ays be able to relieve anx ie ty  and 
disappointm ent and explain the unexpected, it should a t least be able 
to in terpret them  in ways which make them appear determinable or 
a t least provide some way of understanding their indeterminability. 
As Luhm ann states,
This functional way of conceiving religion goes beyond the fam iliar 
controversy as to whether religion relieves anxiety and uncertainty 
or w hether i t  generates them to begin with. Both are in a certain 
sense correct. Religion reformulates the conditions for insecurity. It 
thereby makes an increase in acceptable insecurity possible. ( 1984, 
p.8 italics added)
The problem of indeterminacy is thus sacrilized. Examples of this 
process are the creation of taboos of 'weak points in the social order, 
of transitions, ... of anomalies.' (p.9) The issue of how this function of 
transform ing indeterm inate complexity into determ inate complexity 
is to be performed, Luhmann admits, is too abstract and general a 
concept to tell, us much about the variety of religions or the limits to 
the variations th a t can exist. As we have seen, Luhm ann does not 
subscribe to the view th a t one can characterize religion by reference 
to a single social function. Instead he proposes a system s-theory 
analysis which admits the possibility th a t religion, like every other 
social system, including society, has more than  one problem to solve 
and m ust therefore fulfil more than  one function. Any theory of 
functional systems, he argues, 'must go beyond the mere cataloguing 
of functions and dysfunctions' (p.12) to look, for example, a t problems 
of processing information, problems of representing the world and the 
imm ediate social environment, problems of differentiation of itself 
from other systems and from the environment, problems with the use 
of the medium of faith. All these need to be considered in any 
analysis of religious dogmatics and the evolution of religious identity 
within different social environments.
T h e  e v o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  r e l i g i o u s  i d e n t i t y  o f  I s l a m
In this section we shall look briefly a t some of the dogmas, beliefs and 
practices of Islam, not as cultural curiosities, but as illustrations of 
the way th a t Islam as a religious meaning system has throughout 
history developed within changing social environments. Approaching
allowed him, at least rhetorically, to turn a crushins defeat into a moral victory by 





























































































Islam in this way should allow us to understand with greater clarity 
both the general relationship of religion to society and the specific 
nature of Muslim identity. It should then be possible to throw some 
light on the problems currently faced by Islam in Europe, uprooted 
as it has been from those countries where it is the official religion and 
having to confront the secular societal environm ents of modern 
Western states.
1. Revelation: Islam may be described as a revelationary religion. 
Belief in the Koran, the sacred book is one of the five Articles of Faith 
for Muslims. According to Islamic dogma, the communication of 
revelatory 'Books' to Moses, David Jesus and Mohammed are the 
summation of the intervention of divine grace in favour of hum anity 
[Jomier, 1988, p.54]. For religious dogmatics this notion of revelation 
has distinct advantages. It allows the religion to deal with the issue 
of time in a non-linear form. The Books were not w ritten  by the 
Prophets. They were dictated by God. They do not belong to any 
particular epoch or culture, as they have been transm itted by God to 
the Prophets. Only the date of their transm ission, not the date of 
their authorship are interpreted as historical events. They are of no 
time, but are for all times.
According to Luhmann, the dogma of revelation serves to co-ordinate 
generalization of the religion.
It combines ( D a  universally available authorship  (God) w ith (2) 
widely applicable and interpretable contents whose rationality  and 
interpretability are guaranteed, and (3) with the actual appearance 
of a possibility in  the form (4) of a particular historical event which is 
(5) im m ediately clear and which cannot be changed by any given 
society, because it  is historically unique. Instead it is subject only to 
a theological adm inistration  of dogmas [Luhm ann, 1984, p.90] 
(emphasis in original)
This discovery of a body of religious dogmatics which have both 
universal relevance and specific jurisdiction. The fact th a t they are 
revelations from a super-hum an being m akes negation w ithin 
Islamic dogmatics impossible. The only way in which Islam  can 
respond to pressure from the environment is by re-interpretation. In 
this respect the meaning system is entirely closed and self-referential. 
Moreover the fact th a t this reinterpretation is placed firmly in the 
hands of theological jurisdiction ensures continuity and perpetuation.
In the case of Islam  the revelation of the Koran to Mohammed 
provides additional scope for generalization. Previous revelations, 
according to Islamic dogmatics, had been made by God with the 




























































































people th a t were made to a specific people, the Children of Israel. 
Mohammed was unique in tha t he was sent on a world mission. For 
the purposes of conversion, therefore, the boundaries between Islam 
and society are easily crossed. It requires only a public declaration of 
belief, 7  confirm that there is no god other than God (Allah) and, 
that Mohammed is the Messenger o f God'. This allows for conversion 
of non-believers which involves no initiation rites or exam inations1. 
At the same time it is essential for the preservation of the identity of 
Islam th a t the notion of revelation - th a t the Koran was dictated to 
Mohammed by the Angel Gabriel to whom it had be given by God, 
Himself - is kept constantly in the forefront of belief. This accounts 
for the  need for constant repetition of the uniqueness of the 
revelation. Hence the five daily prayers.
Finally, the existence of a revelatory Book makes possible the kind of 
binary decision of the acceptability/non-acceptability, of different 
forms of behaviour and validity/invalidity of different Koranic and 
S hari'a  in terp re ta tions, th a t Luhm ann m aintains is of 'central 
significance' for the organization of the religious system as a church 
or social in s titu tio n  (p .90). However, despite the  claim  of 
fundam entalists th a t the Koran represents a 'constitution for the 
universe' [Jom ier, 1988, p.61], in reality  the com m andm ents 
contained in the Koran are few and often imprecise. For Islam, 
therefore, the revelatory Book is the ultimate legitimator of what has 
subsequently become known as Islamic law rather than  being the 
source of all legal knowledge. This has enabled religion to keep a 
close control over the development of law by ensuring th a t Islamic 
law cannot go beyond certain limits and so cannot itself become a 
closed meaning system. Although historically this has ensured the 
survival of Islamic law, it has also m eant th a t even in Islamic 
countries it has increasingly been forced to accept the imposition of 
secular law alongside its own jurisdiction. Moreover, this jurisdiction 
has itself been increasingly restricted to family, private law matters. 
This area of law, relating to the personal status of men and women 
and their relationships with one another within and outside marriage 
and the control each respectively organizes over their children has 
come to represent for several 'Islamic states' the essence of Islamic 
law. Indeed, recently the symbolic demarcation of Muslim/non- 
M uslim has tended to be organized around these rules of personal 
sta tus derived from Koranic exegesis. While within the political and 
economic system s of M uslim  countries the  K oran and its 
interpretation is seen as having little relevance to daily decisions, it is 
of the highest importance to the way in which families are organized
1 According to Manazir Ahsan, Ihe Director General of the Islamic Foundation. 




























































































and especially the roles for men and women and their power relations 
within families.
2. The Creation and Destruction o f the W orld: According to a
systems functional analysis, religions were able to deal with society's 
problem of causality, only after they had constructed a concept of 
time as
'a meaningful relationship between temporally d istan t events of the 
p as t and future. It m ust also be seen as the space in  which 
communication develops. T hat is, it m ust be seen historically. For 
this way of thinking, history is the history of decisions to which God 
responds accordingly. It is reflected as dialogue with God.' [Luhmann,
1984, p.86]
In Christianity, Judaism  and Islam, therefore, time came to be seen 
both as an eternal present, the continuing act of giving life to 
individuals, between two fixed points, the creation and destruction of 
the world. A causal schema could thus be seen to exist for all events 
in the social world. At a second level, the changing of past into 
future implicit in The Judgement Day allowed for the existence of a 
notion of progression (p.67)
Islam accepts the version of creation set out in Genesis, and the 
Koran places much emphasis on the fact th a t hum ankind is God’s 
creation. 'It is he who has created you from clay. He has decreed a 
term  for you in th is world and another in the next'. (Koran 6:2). 
Creation is the one external proof of God’s existence and His powers. 
The Koran challenges any of the false idolatrous gods to recreate the 
world as proof th a t they are really divine. The fact th a t none of them 
of done so is evidence of God's divinity.
Elsewhere in Islamic dogmatics the creation is evoked to remind man 
of the mercy of God who nourishes and brings to him those whom he 
needs. It shows also the power of God, capable of giving life and thus 
of renewing it on the day when he revives the dead. In the face of 
God, man is the servant before his m aster this tru th  is w ritten in the 
very depths of hum an nature  the man who denies it cannot be 
forgiven [Jomier, 1984, p.50]
A im portan t p a rt of Muslim dogmatics concerns causality , in 
particular where they describe the catastrophic events th a t will occur 
when the world ends. As in the C hristian version of the Day of 
Judgm ent there is the image of bodies climbing out their graves a t 
the sound of trum pet for the last judgment, then the judgm ent itself 
with its balancing of deeds, the books which will be opened, the 




























































































Will not be eternal for believers. The intercession of Mohammed will 
ensure the release of those who are a t heart believers in whom where 
one can still find an atom of faith, even if only after thousands of 
years of punishment.
There is, of course, a contradiction implicit in Islamic dogmatics (as 
there  is in Judaism  and C hristianity) concerning the issue of 
determinism and responsibility. This is the theological debate which 
concerning whether God, as all-powerful and all-seeing supposes is 
capable, not only of knowing in advance how men and women will 
behave, but also of determining th a t behaviour. If God does indeed 
determine behaviour, then how is this compatible with the concept of 
free-will and responsibility and, indeed, with the very concept tha t 
men and women should be judged and subjected to rew ards and 
punishm ents. This contradiction is resolved in part by the existence 
in the Koran of tha t other supernatural figure, the Devil, (who is also 
God's creation) which makes it possibility for m ankind to make 
choices between good and evil, two paths which lead in opposite 
directions.
In Islam, as in some forms of Christianity, this distinction between 
good and evil, God and the Devil, serves to not only to rem ind 
believers what will happen to them if they disobey God's word, but 
also to differentiate Muslims from non-Muslims, since it is impossible 
for the faithless to be on the side of Good or to be rewarded in the 
world to come. Indeed, there is some considerable debate among 
Muslim theologians as to whether infidels of good faith may also be 
saved. Several of them (e.g. al-Ghazali, 1058-1111) accept th a t those 
infidels who are of good faith could be saved, if they were not morally 
responsible for their lack of belief [Jomier, 1988 p.58]. As Luhmann 
points out, religious systems, like Christianity, Judaism  and Islam, 
which traditionally have made sharp distinctions between members 
and non-members, increasingly discover th a t their own members do 
not meet the expectations of the religion and th a t non-believers may 
be following th e ir  own religious faith. I t  therefore becomes 
increasingly difficult to reconstruct the world as being divided along 
simple lines between believers, who are necessarily good and non­
believers, who are necessarily bad. The similarities between members 
and non-members were impossible to ignore. In Islam  further 
d istinctions were developed between non-believers who were 
nevertheless 'brothers of the Book' (Jews and Christians) and other 
non-Muslims, such as Hindus and Buddhists. The Shari'a rules, 
which evolved around m arriages between Muslims and Brothers of 
the Book, were further evidence of recognition th a t simple good/evil 
reconstruction of the ex ternal world could not be sustained . 




























































































reconstructions in different forms in response to perceived th rea ts  to 
Muslim identity from the external environment.
3. Self-reference and Authenticity
An im portan t question for Islam  to answer concerned its own 
authenticity and, in particular the authenticity of the Koran and of 
Mohammed as a Prophet and God's last envoy to mankind. Where 
was the proof of th is authenticity? Criteria and evidence of proof 
clearly change over time and according to the particular belief system 
of those demanding proof. It was, therefore, necessary for Islam  to 
protect itself against the scepticism not ju st of one historical epoch, 
but for all time. This was achieved by the production of a closed 
system, not so much of knowledge, but of belief.
In the Koran the objectors recalled the fact tha t the ancient prophets 
had performed miracles to confirm the divine origin of their mission 
and they summoned Mohammed to do the same. The Koran, 
however, protested  against this demand and in re itera tin g  its 
confirmation of the divine origin of the Koran, it presents itself as the 
great miracle proving the authenticity of the revelation received by 
Muslims. The professions of faith affirm th a t the Koran is of divine 
origin and possesses qualities such tha t no creature could have or will 
be able to compose its like. The Koran defies anyone to produce a 
single chapter which can equal those of the Koran (10:37-8, 52:25- 
42, 69:42-3,) Since nobody has been able to meet this challenge, the 
divine origin of the Koran has been definitively proved. [Jomier, 
1988, p.56]. As with creation, therefore, the proof of the Koran's 
authenticity, therefore lies in itself. The evidence of the tex t is all 
th a t true believers need or are entitled to in order to validate the 
claim for authenticity. If they doubt the text by requiring further or 
different evidence, then they cannot claim to be true  believers. 
According to the same logic, Mohammed m ust be God's Messenger, 
because the Koran was transmitted to him.
The circular nature of the argument is obvious, but it has served, not 
only to convince Muslims of the divine authorship of the Koran and 
thus of Mohammed sta tus as the last Prophet/Envoy, bu t also to 
differentiate a religious Islamic system of meaning based on faith 
and faith alone from all other meaning systems both inside and 
outside the Muslim world. The tru th  in Islam can be discovered only 
by referring to the Koran and the evidence of the tru th  of the Koran 
is the Koran. Believers may then refer all issues concerning the 
rightness, wrongness, good or evil of events selected from the 
external social environment as well as the causes and consequences 
of such events for religious interpretation by reconstructing them  in 




























































































th a t other meaning systems, whether rationalistic, scientific, political 
or whatever produce different answers or in terpret these events in 
different ways or even th a t they find the issues concerned trivial or 
insignificant is of no consequence for religious dogma of Islam  
(although, as we shall see, it may have consequences for Muslims).
5. The M edium o f Faith: As we have seen, simply to refer back to 
itse lf provides Islam  (and other religions) w ith the necessity of 
having to prove the authenticity problem on any but its own terms. 
On its own, it does not present any reasons why Islam 's solution to 
the problem should be more acceptable than any other. An essential 
elem ent is missing. This is the communication medium, the 
language which makes it possible for religion to manage contingency 
issues in the social environment by transforming into w hat it claims 
are exclusively religious terms. For other systems love, money, and 
tru th  are communication media. For Islam, and other highly evolved 
religious systems, it is faith.
Luhm ann's account of the evolution of religious dogmatics describes 
how, as religion takes on a specific, but universally relevant function 
in society, it's internal basis must also switch from ritual to faith.
The amplitude- of m yths and explanations which was normal and 
harm less in older religions based on ritual and cult is no longer 
tolerable if religion is based on more highly generalised symbols. The 
correct understanding of faith can and indeed m ust become the 
subject of controversy, the settling of which spurs the fu rthe r 
development of dogma. [Luhmann, 1984, p.34]
The development of dogmatic theology presupposes th a t faith  has 
become reflexive (p.62) tha t ’[T]he faith process can, ... "formulate" 
the condition of its own possibility’, using faith, for example, to 
determine the correctness or fallibility of its own concepts which are 
themselves based on the medium of faith. In Islam the use of the 
formula of the shahada - a negative phrase (there is no divinity 
outside God), which removes everything tha t is not God, but reserves 
the question of the mystery of God to Himself, a mystery into which 
the believer him self is forbidden from unravelling - is seen as the 
only correct way of conceptualizing God. In the same way th a t 
positive legal systems presuppose th a t the establishm ent of norms 
can itself be made subject to norms, so religion achieves reflexivity 
through the faith medium by assuming the right to determine the 
conditions establishing the existence or non-existence of faith , of 
im plem enting a binary code th a t separates the faithful from the 
faithless, the believer from the infidel. 'The reflexive process applies 
itself to itself and changes itself [Luhmann, 1984, p.94 emphasis in 




























































































achievem ent of reflexivity th a t makes possible the tran sition  of 
religion to modern societies.
If the language of faith is to be available for a variety of social 
situations, it m ust be generalized beyond those acts which in specific 
religions are the evidence of the existence of faith [Luhmann, p.58]. 
Yet, once the medium of faith becomes universalized beyond actual 
manifestations of faith to witnesses and testimonies of faith th a t one 
finds in religious rituals there is a danger th a t 'faith inflation' may 
occur. This de-ritualization of religions means th a t religious motives, 
ra th e r  th an  ritua ls , become all-im portant in deciding w hat is 
ap p rop ria te  to select from the  ex te rnal env ironm ent for 
communication and coding by the language of faith. There is no 
guarantee th a t religion will be able to control the scope and direction 
of these transformations. Faith, like 'love' or 'truth ', may be taken to 
a level of abstract generalization where it loses all ability to serve 
society's contingency-m anaging requirem ents. F aith , in these 
circumstances, risks becoming a formula for justifying everything 
and anything. Like the superstitious concept of 'fate', it's absence or 
presence may be presented as the cause of all unexpected or 
scientifically inexplicable events.
RELIGION IN MODERN SOCIETY
1. W hile Luhm ann, following D urkheim 's d istinction betw een 
m echanical and organic solidarity , sees m odern societies as 
fundam entally different in their organization from trad itional or 
'archaic' societies he breaks w ith Durkheim  and the dualistic 
sociological tradition th a t works with only two distinct types of social 
organization. For Luhmann, as we have mentioned, modern societies 
are characterized above all by their complexity and above all by the 
diversity and self-reflexive nature  of their functional subsystem s 
[Luhmann, 1984, p.74-5] which makes it impossible for them  to be 
regulated as a cohesive organization, as was the case in traditional 
societies. This fundam ental difference avoids the kind of rigid 
segmentation of power and wealth that occurs in traditional societies. 
It also m eans th a t these subsystems are continually involved in 
a tte m p ts  to influence the  ex te rnal env ironm ent by th e ir  
communications and in responding to 'interference' from other sub­
systems by imposing their own meanings on communications from 
other subsystems.
2 . W hat difficulties then have to be faced by religious system s as 
they confront th is fragm entation of m eaning system s and their 




























































































religion can no longer rely upon the uniqueness or u tility  of its 
function of contingency management. A part from specific rituals 
denoting s ta tu s  changes, in, for example, baptism , confirmation, 
m arriage, or the crowning of a monarch, it can expect to be called 
upon only in certain specific situations, of particular uncertainty and 
anxiety, such as unexpected death or incurable illness. Indeed 
religion tends to restrict its role of in modern societies largely to tha t 
of a 'helping h an d ’ [Luhmann, 1984, p.41]. I t  is no longer 
functionally necessary a t the level of society as a whole, since other 
systems, such as science and law, compete with it, and have by and 
large become more successful than  it, in the task  of m anaging 
disappointments and stabilizing congruent expectations.
Any attem pt by religion to pursue in modern societies the functions 
th a t it served in traditional societies will continually be thw arted by 
the fact that, the notion of faith, while still existing within religious 
dogmatics, 'has largely ceased to function as a code for general social 
processes' [Luhmann, 1984, p.64] In order fulfil its traditional roles, 
therefore, religion increasingly has to formulate its communications 
in the codes of other social meaning systems, such as law, politics, 
medicine, education or social science. Moreover, as a price for 
influence over society and other systems it has progressively been 
obliged to couch its message in terms of a general morality which is 
not dependent upon the  existence of a tran scen d en ta l force 
determining events in the world. It is not at all surprising, therefore, 
to find religious leaders making claims for religions as providing 'the 
structures of our common life' [Sacks, 1991, p.93] or portraying other 
social institutions as breeding grounds for selfishness, m aterialism  
and intolerance. Increasingly 'tru th ', 'love', 'self-discipline' and 
'cohesiveness' come to take the place of faith  as the media for 
religious communications. Shabbir Akhtar, a t the Florence workshop 
went so far as to claim th a t the moral health of society is dependent 
upon adherence to a religious code in his claim that,
the relation between religion and the strict regulation of the sexual 
impulse is a necessary one; sexual cultures are bound to assume the 
view th a t sexual activity is largely a technique for recreation and 
enjoyment. In other words successful sanctions against sexual 
indulgence are exclusively religious in motivation.
Discipline in sexual m atters cannot, according to this construction of 
society, exist without religion.
3. The post-Enlightenm ent rationality, which can be said to 
characterize modern societies' reconstruction of the social and 
physical environm ent threatened to leave religious organizations 




























































































reconstruct the world in m etaphysical ways, relying upon a 
transcendental notion of God and God's Judgement, found unable to 
form alliances between religion and other social subsystem s and 
in creas in g ly  incapab le  of in fluencing  society by th e ir  
communications. Religion, therefore, has progressively found itself 
obliged to reconstruct the social environment along u tilita rian  lines 
in term s of the advantages th a t religious affiliation in general offers 
both individual beings and society. Decreasing emphasis tends to be 
placed on the 'truth ' of one religion over another. Instead a religious 
identity per se is seen as an affirmation of these advantages, ju s t as 
'faithlessness' was projected as their negation. As a resu lt the 
m eaning sub-system of politics, has been able in certain sta tes to 
formulate religion in terms of its responsibility for the moral health of 
the nation and the absence of religion as indicating 'sp iritual 
bankruptcy' leading to delinquency, self-indulgence and a lack of 
community solidarity.
4. Luhm ann identifies a further problem for religion in its function 
of managing disappointments and uncertainty by its ability to make 
contingencies arising in the social environment determ inate or, at 
least, determinable. By basing faith, in contrast to knowledge, on the 
ultim ate uniqueness, heterogeneity and ubiquity of the personality of 
God m eans th a t religion's relationship to its im m ediate social 
environm ent is no different to its relationship to the world. The 
doctrine of revelation made it possible to believe th a t a generalised, 
non-worldly God could be made specific in ways th a t  were 
appropriate for any social environm ent. Yet, today, the  social 
understanding of time has allowed a historical understanding of the 
revelation  dogma, m aking it u n certa in  as to w h e th er the  
in terpretation and reinterpretation of revelation can still fulfil the 
function of religion in the modern world. [Hegel, 1934, pp.89ff; 
Luhmann, 1984, pp.98-99].
Even if it may be possible to determine contingency for individual 
societies, how will this be possible for the world society th a t has come 
into existence? When each societal system was relatively firm and 
fixed and used other societies as its environment, it was possible for 
religious dogmatics to make th e ir abstractions for contingency 
determination dependent (albeit latently) upon the specific structures 
of the society concerned, such as stratification, dom ination and 
morality. It is highly questionable whether religion will be able to 
able to reconstruct the global society in this way. [Luhmann, 1984, 
p.99]. This suggests a major fragm entation of religious dogmatics 
may occur, w ith religions becoming increasingly localised and 




























































































the ability of universally relevant dogmatics to solve contingency 
problems.
R e l i g i o n  a n d  t h e  F a m il y
As religion is obliged to satisfy growing social demands th a t it should 
contribute directly to morality and happiness within a framework set 
by other social sub-systems, it has placed increasing emphasis on the 
family as the sphere in which religious identity and moral values are 
preserved and transm itted from one generation to another. It is no 
surprise, therefore, to hear Jonathan Sacks, the Chief Rabbi of Great 
B ritain, claiming the family for religion, when he sta tes th a t 'the 
family is a religious institution  th a t survives in a secular culture’ 
[Sacks, p.57, em phasis added] He goes on to suggest both th a t 
religion gives meaning to the family, which left to secularism would 
have no meaning and also that, in the case of Judaism  at least, the 
survival of the religion and the Jewish people ’is due, above all, to 
the streng th  of the family' [Sacks, 1991, p.57] In religious term s, 
therefore, the family becomes therefore at one and the same time an 
environm ent for the reproduction of religion and a system which 
depends on religion.
A glance a t several of the papers from the Florence Workshop shows 
th a t the Muslim religious representatives from England and France 
also tended to place considerable emphasis on the notion of 'the 
Muslim family'. Increasingly, this ideal notion of 'the Muslim family', 
ra th e r th an  the coding, 'faith/faithlessness or the observance/non- 
observance of p rayer and ritua l is seen as dem arcating the 
boundaries between the Islamic and the non-Islamic and between 
the religiously lawful/good and the religiously unlawful/bad. Muslim 
families are presented as cohesive units, in which roles are clearly 
defined, and where each member exercises self-discipline and respect 
for others. They are hierarchical both in term s of gender and age 
and the m aintenance of authority and respect for th a t authority is 
seen as being essential to the family's well-being. This is contrasted 
with modern, non-Islamic families which tend to be portrayed as 
divorce-prone, unstructured, lacking in cohesion and generally in a 
state of moral chaos. Moreover, if in practice some Muslim families do 
not live up to these ideals, the blame is placed firmly at the door of 
modernity and its pernicious influence, particularly on women and 
the younger generation.
From a religious perspective any differentiation between Muslim and 
non-Muslim based on family structure cannot simply replace previous 




























































































one presupposing the others. Muslims in W estern countries are 
identifiab le by th e ir  belief in God's un iqueness and in the 
au thentic ity  of Mohammed's message, but the existence of 'the 
Muslim family' stands increasingly, not as a substitu te for, bu t as 
evidence of th a t faith and th a t belief.
This particular form in which religious dogmatics has evolved may 
well provide considerable advantages for Islamic identity in modern 
W estern societies. It reconstructs in way tha t are compatible with its 
own religious coding the divisions in the secular society and in 
secular sub-systems, such as law and politics, between public and 
private. If Islam is unable to solve the contingency problems of 
modern society, a t least it is able to give the impression of being able 
to solve it's moral problems. This enables Islam  in its external 
communications to exercise influence over the evolution of societies in 
ways which enhance its own existence.
It does not conflict with Enlightenment principles of rationalism  and 
individual freedom. Adapting the principles of Islamic family life 
need no longer be a m atter of a blind, unquestioning acceptance of 
God's law, but can be shown 'scientifically' to be good for each 
member of the family and for society in term s of the protection it 
offers against delinquency, immorality and alienation. So far as 
individual is concerned, therefore, there is now in existence a version 
of Islam, which may become reconstructed as an im portant aspect of 
'self or 'identity'. It also offers the prospect of behaving in his or her 
public life a t work or in business and politics in every way like a 
W estern European as long as within the home the laws of Islam  are 
obeyed and the ideal of the Muslim family, respected.
THE CONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION AS A SECULAR IDENTITY
Religions, as social meaning systems from which people may derive a 
belonging identity, are far from being stable fixed points in a social 
world which is changing all-too-rapidly around us. Like all other 
social in stitu tions in modern society, religions are  continually 
reconstructing themselves as a result of their confrontation with the 
external social world. These changes are inevitable once traditional 
religions enter the meaning world of modern secular societies. The 
precise forms th a t they take are impossible to predict, as the depend 
upon a wide variety of internal and external factors, but in gross 
term s, there is likely to be a fragm entation of in ternal m eaning 
which will reflects the fragmentation of discourses in the external 
social world. This has already happened to Judaism  in w estern 




























































































themselves as in relation to a single Jewish identity -one was either a 
Jew or not a Jew  and as a Jew one was either a good Jew or a bad 
Jew, it is now possible to identify with a particular kind of Jewish 
identity, which exists independently of any religious or regional 
sectarianism  in Judaism  itself. One can be an 'orthodox', 'reform', 
'liberal', 'practising', 'non-practising' or 'cultural' Jew, and still call 
oneself 'Jewish'. Jewishness need no long depend upon belief or 
practice. At the extremes the orthodox Jew and the cultural Jew 
have absolutely nothing in common other than  the fact th a t both call 
themselves 'Jewish'. Between these two extremes there is very little 
except a vague, ill-defmed Jewish identity th a t binds together Jews 
from different countries of the world or even from different walks of 
life.
As we have seen, in W estern societies the fact of belonging to a 
religion, of having a religious identity, is increasingly portrayed by 
religions themselves in term s of the advantages this provides to the 
individual in this world rather than  in the world to come. A belief in 
the notion of a transcendental God whose will governs both physical 
events and hum an actions together with the notion of faith as the 
u ltim ate criteria on which hum an beings will be judged tends to 
re trea t into the background of religious discourse. As a footnote to 
th is account of the internal secularization of religion, it should be 
emphasised, th a t fundamentalism moves in diametrically the opposite 
directions. Rather than acknowledging the need for religion to evolve 
in response to social pressures from the external environm ent, 
fundam entalists see no areas of social existence as being exempt from 
God's will and God's law. Their goal is, therefore, to incorporate all 
aspects of public life including law politics and governm ent are 
w ithin a divine order determined by what they see as rigid and 
unchanging dogmatics [Arjomand,1989].
We need to be aware, however tha t the process of religious evolution 
and the transform ation of religious identity by religion itself, as 
described so convincingly by Luhmann, is only one aspect of the 
secularization process and the construction of a secular religious 
identity. A second set of processes concerns the transform ation of 
religions through by secular m eaning system s. J u s t  as the 
sacrilization of the social environment and social systems operating 
w ithin th a t  environm ent occurs w ithin religion, so religion is 
reconstructed by other specialized social sub-systems and by society 
on their term s. Through this process issues which s ta r t out as 
m atters  of belief, faith  and obedience of God's commands are 
transla ted  or reconstructed within politics, law or economics into 
terms which make sense for these meaning systems. This is not mere 




























































































political or economic ambitions, nor is it to suggest th a t religions are 
somehow destroyed or corrupted by secular institutions. W ithin 
secular discourses, nominally, a t least, the religion re ta in s  its 
separa te  identity , but its m eaning is changed. C hristian ity , 
Judaism , Islam all exist as legal, political or economic subjects, but 
these meaning systems select from religion those aspects which are 
readily understood in legal, political and economic terms. The rest is 
filtered out.
Although Sacks in his rhetorical defence of religious faith  sees 
enormous dangers for religion in this secularization process, since 
'religion' according to him, 'is about the soul, not about society' 
[Sacks, 1991, p.98], to in terpret this process in entirely negative 
term s is to miss the im portant point th a t some secularization is 
essential if minority religious groups are to receive any recognition 
and defence of their dogmas and practices within secular, pluralistic 
societies. It is only through this process of reconstruction th a t the 
irreconcilable becomes reconciled and the incommensurable becomes 
commensurable. It is through the reconstruction of religion within 
secular discourses that people, who, while in their separate spheres of 
religious meaning world could not begin to understand one another, 
are now able to speak the same language and so able to engage in 
reasonable disagreements with one another.
In order to illustrate how this complex process of reconstruction takes 
place, I shall in the following section analyses briefly some recent 
encounters between Islam and the law in England and France. I 
would emphasise, however, firstly th a t law is only one of several 
social meaning systems involved in this reconstruction process1 and, 
secondly, th a t in the short space available here, it is not possible to 
offer more than  a sample of these encounters and to make more than  
the briefest overview of these processes a t work.
ISLAM AND MODERN LAW
How then  does modern law reconstruct Islam? In the first place, as 
one might expect, Islam is divided up and classified according to the 
conceptual meaning categories th a t exist in the modern world. The 
Muslim religion, morality, and law become separated  from one 
another in order to make them amenable to ordering by and within 
the modern legal system. Not only may this separation conflict with
1 Others are politics, economics and art. See, e.g., Wiluol de Wenden (1990) for an 





























































































the diffused nature  of these three concepts in traditional Islamic 
societies, but, as Poulter points out, 'the S h a r i'a  or sacred law 
comprises not only laws enforceable by political authority, bu t also 
m orals, m anners and obligations binding on the  individual 
conscience alone' [Poulter, 1986, p.4], 'Islamic law' becomes then 
'the law of Islamic states' and obligations which were a t one time a 
m atter of 'individual conscience', or m atters between God and man, 
reinforced by the opinion of others within cohesive communities, are 
transform ed into impersonal rules enforceable by state  authority. 
Law is given a m eaning which corresponds with a westernized 
conception of legality in ways which allow English courts in cases of 
conflicts of law to call upon the opinions of 'experts in Islamic law' 
and French judges to take upon themselves the task of interpreting 
principles of Muslim law.1 The fact that the very notion of 'a Muslim 
law' is highly problematic, with deep divisions between different 
schools of law and between theological and historical accounts of the 
law's development and interpretation, (See T urner,1974; Coulson 
1964; Pearl, 1979, ch.l, Schacht 1964) does not seem to deter modern 
western ju ris ts  from conceiving it as 'a legal system' which may be 
seen to exist alongside other legal systems in the modern world.
Modern law cannot construct religion as a private communion 
between the individual and God. Beliefs and faith are not amenable 
to legal ordering. For law, therefore, religion exists essentially as the 
those customs, rites and rituals which in the public domain come to 
symbolise statem ents of faith and holiness. Law, therefore, tends to 
reconstruct religion as rights of worship and performance of ritual. 
Once reconstructed  in th is way each religion may be seen as 
constituting for law a set of rights, such as the right not to work on 
the sabbath, the right to perform kill and prepare anim als for food 
according to ritual rules, the right to wear clothes or hair styles in 
ways which conform with religious requirements. Once constituted 
as rights, religions may take their place in a legal world where their 
particular demands and obligations may be related to, compared with 
and placed in rank  order with all other rights, obligations and 
demands.
The case of Ahm ad v ILEA  2 illustrates this point well. In this case 
Mr. Ahmad, a devout Muslim, was employed as a schoolteacher. In 
accordance with the dictates of the Koran he attended prayers at a 
mosque every Friday, but in doing so he returned to his school some 
forty m inutes after the s ta rt of classes. As a result the head-teacher 
wrote to him saying th a t if he continued to take time off school there
1 See Halimah Boumidienne's talk at the Florence Workshop




























































































would be no alternative but to vary his appointment from a full-time 
post to a part-tim e position of four and a half days per week. Mr. 
Ahmed replied saying th a t he would ra ther resign than  accept the 
offer of a part-time position. This he did. Subsequently, he appealed 
to an Industria l T ribunal claiming th a t he had been unfairly  
dismissed or alternatively forced to change his position from full-time 
to part-tim e. This he argued contravened section 30 of the 
Education Act 1944 which stated that
... no person shall be disqualified by reason of his religious opinions, or 
of his attending or omitting to attend religious worship, from being a 
teacher ...
and
no teacher ... shall ... receive any less em olum ent... by reason of the 
fact th a t he does or does not give religious instruction or by reason of 
his religious opinions or of his attending or omitting to attend religious 
worship...
Both the Industrial Tribunal and the Employment Appeal Tribunal 
decided th a t the object of this provision was 'to protect individual 
teachers ... from being penalised in any way by reason of their 
religious beliefs or of their ... not attending religious worship' and 
could not ' be construed as authorising a breach o f contract by a 
teacher in absenting himself during school hours for the purpose of 
attending religious worship' (italics added)
Mr. Ahm ed also drew the a tten tion  of the T ribunal (and 
subsequently, the Court of Appeal) to Article 9 of the European  
Convention on Human Rights which guarantees freedom of worship,
subject only to such lim itations as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary in a democratic society in the in terests of public safety, 
for the protection of public order, health  or m orals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedom of others.
For our purposes, it is interesting to note what issues were selected as 
salient when the case was discussed by the judges of the Court of 
Appeal. In the first place, there was some considerable concern over 
the natu re  of the religious duty to attend Friday's congregational 
prayers. Was this an absolute obligation or were there legitim ate 
excuses for not attending? Was employment, like sickness, a 'good 
reason' for not attending? Since Muslims were required to re tu rn  to 
work after attending prayers, was it not advisable for a Muslim 'not 
to become involved in an employment which prevents his attending a 
mosque'? (p 579). Was it not proof of Mr. Ahmad's obedience to the 
requirem ent of Islam th a t when teaching at a school which was not 
w ithin easy reach of the nearest mosque he did not take tim e off 




























































































attending? W hat the appeal court attempted to do, therefore, was to 
assess the strength  and nature of the obligation upon a Muslim to 
attend Fridays prayers and to couch this obligation in legal or quasi- 
legal language. Despite the expert evidence of 'an Islamic religious 
leader’ the  issue of w hether or not to attend prayers is 'for the 
individual to reconcile with his own conscience' , a private m atter 
between him and God, the judges insisted on seeing it in term s of 
some external authority requiring attendance and setting out those 
circumstances which could legitimately excuse non-attendance. In 
other words was there a law, God's law, Islamic law, which conflicted 
directly with Mr. Ahmad's contractual obligations? The fact th a t the 
Islamic experts' did not advise of any such unequivocal duty and no 
other Muslims in the employment of the educational authority had 
requested time off work on Fridays, led the majority of the judges to 
conclude th a t there was not.
The dissenting opinion of Lord Scarman is also instructive. He saw 
the issue essentially as one of community relations.
Religions such as Islam and Buddhism have a substantial following 
among our people. Room has to be found for teachers and pupils of 
the new religions in the educational system, if discrimination is to be 
avoided ... The system  m ust be made sufficiently flexible to  
accommodate their beliefs and their observances, otherwise they will 
suffer discrimination. ( p.583 italics added)
The attendance at Friday prayers represents, therefore, an 
expression of difference which needed to be recognized and 
understood in a plural society. As Lord Scarman pointed out,
A narrow construction of the section (Section 30) would mean th a t a 
Muslim, who took his religious duties seriously, could never accept 
employment as a full-time teacher, (p.585)
He concluded, therefore, tha t the case 'begins with, but does not end 
with the law of contract. It ends with ... the application of the new 
law associated with the protection of the individual's hum an rights 
and fundam ental freedoms'(ibid).
I am not suggesting here th a t there was anything wrong with Lord 
Scarm an's line of reasoning or for th a t m atte r w ith contrary 
conclusion reached by the majority of the court. Both are quite 
legitim ate as interpretations of the law. My point is ra ther th a t in 
producing a legal judgment (and dissent) out of the conflictual tha t 
had arisen  between Mr. Ahmad and the education authority  the 
court had necessarily been obliged to reconstruct Islam in a way tha t 




























































































Muslims apart from others, tha t made them different. Once this had 
been established the legal issue became whether the particular ritual 
of Friday prayers was such th a t it could be given the s ta tu s  of a 
fundam ental right or whether it should take a subservient place to 
contractual obligations.
If we tu rn  now to the Conseil d 'E ta t's consideration of the French 
head-scarf (fou lard  or tchador) case, we find religion set against 
secularism  ra th e r  th an  contractual obligations. Once again, 
however the very notions of religion and secularism are constructed 
in abstract legal ways in order tha t a legal conflict can be abstracted 
from the social events and law produced to resolve the  conflict. 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the way in which the issue of 
the th ree  M uslim s girls who were expelled from school was 
reconstructed by the French Conseil d'Etat lies in the fact th a t not 
once in the five page judgem ent does the word Islam  or Muslim 
appear. Nor indeed is there any reference to the item of clothing tha t 
caused so much offence. The questions put to the Conseil d 'état 
were not concerned with m atters of motives, beliefs, traditions and 
even less with those conflicting interpretations of the verses of the of 
the Koran or the debate over the oppression of women which had 
aroused so much feeling at the Florence Workshop. Its  brief was 
simply to answer the three questions posed by the M inistre de 
l'Education National de la Jeunesse et des Sports,
1. If, taking into account the principles set out in the Constitution et 
the laws of the République et having regard to the body of regulations 
covering the organization and operation of state schools, the wearing 
of insignia denoting affiliation to a religious community is or is not 
compatible with the principle of secularism (laïcité);
2. If so, what conditions may be applied to it by ministerial directives, 
school rules and decisions of head teachers;
3. If the wearing of such insignia is banned, or if the conditions 
concerning the wearing of such insignia are not met, w hat steps 
(such as refusal to admit a pupil or expulsion) are available and what 
procedures and other safeguards shall be applied.
This reduction of the issues to a legal form ula which could be 
answ ered by ano ther legal form ula avoided all th e  m essy 
complexities which made the case so interesting from a sociological 
perspective - the inequality of women in Muslim families, racism in 
French society, the French cultural legacy which dom inates the 
’neutral' school curriculum. Instead, as Poulter pointed out a t the 
Florence Workshop the Conseil d'état was able to present an account 
of all the relevant provisions of the Constitution and international 




























































































obligations of schools and other public institutions under French law, 
before coming down on the side of pluralism and toleration.
Despite th e ir  different outcomes, in both these cases the law 
recognizes the Islamic religion as a legal construction, an artefact of 
law. Clearly, this does not mean th a t it is diminished or ceases to 
exist as a religion, but nor does it mean that, as a religion, it is any 
stronger or more truthful. Rather, Islam takes on the identity-in-law 
of 'legal religiosity', offering to its adherents an absolute or limited 
right to engage in prayer and ritual, and the claim th a t they are 
subject to a set of rules or laws of traditional origin to which other 
people, non-M uslims are not subject. Muslims are accepted as 
different, but not so different tha t they cannot be brought within the 
ambit of the liberal state. The law reinforces those aspects of Islam 
which signify acceptable difference, while neglecting or rejecting 
others, which offend liberal sensibilities through their denial of 
individual freedoms (such as bigamy and paternal rights over young 
children) regardless of their salience to the traditional identity of the 
religion.
A sim ilar reconstitution of religion occurs w ithin other secular 
in stitu tions of modern w estern societies, such as politics and 
economics and education. For individual Muslims, this process of 
reconstitution avoids the need to make difficult choices. They can 
become citizens while a t the same time retaining their Muslim 
identity, for, as we have seen, this identity no longer has to rely for 
its legitimation on traditional values and criteria. Thus it is possible 
for a woman who has m arried a non-Muslim still to speak of herself 
quite seriously as a Muslim, because the secularization of Islam 
through liberal state  institutions have given birth  to a concept of 
'being Muslim' which avoids these contradictions.
Of course, such accommodations are possible with all institutions of 
modern w estern society. The normative statem ents generated by 
science and medicine, for example, and their ways of resolving issues 
of contingency or disappointed expectations are often incompatible 
with those of traditional religions such as Islam. Science is able to 
understand and reconstitute religion only as a social phenomenon, 
and medicine tends to see it only as a set of superstitious beliefs and 
practices. Faced with incompatible explanations, individuals are 
often forced to make difficult choices between one or the other, since 
explanations based on the concepts of 'God's will' or 'evil spirits' no 
longer seem satisfactory to many of them. In order to rescue its 
separate s ta tu s  as a norm producing institution, religion has to 
withdraw from the predicting, prophesying role which it performed in 




























































































'inexplicable' or 'the coincidental.' Practices, therefore, which within 
religious meaning systems were seen as promoting health, such as 
not eating certain foods or not having sexual intercourse during 
m enstruation, are reform ulated as rituals, having m eaning only 
within a closed religious system.
Co n c l u s io n :
t h e  R e c o n s t r u c t io n  o f  r e l ig io n  w it h in  R e l ig io n
This brief and limited discussion of the way tha t science and medicine 
obliges religion to adapt itself to new conditions leads me to the final 
part of this examination of the Muslim identity, which is concerned 
w ith th is  dynamic aspect of religion, constantly  engaged in 
reconstituting itself and re-differentiating itself in its relations with 
the external social environment. The dilemma for Muslim leaders in 
the  W est is th a t  the rules and practices which they  see as 
constituting the Muslim identity and with protecting and reproducing 
th a t identity, in several instances clash headlong with the principles 
of equality and individual freedom which characterize W estern 
secularism. To locate this issue in one specific context, how can Islam 
survive in the West, if its laws against interm arriage and female 
inequality  are increasingly ignored, yet equally how can Islam  
reassert its authority against interm arriage without jeopardizing its 
privileged role of representing a legitimate identity for individuals 
within secular state institutions?
One answer to this dilemma th a t we have already examined is for 
Islam to emphasise increasingly on the family and the private world 
of the individual. In this guise Islam becomes the religion of family 
cohesion and, as such, a moral force in a degenerate and immoral 
social world. For Muslims, this notion of moral superiority serves to 
reinforce th e ir  religious identity , while, a t  the  sam e tim e, 
encouraging them  to differentiate themselves from the 'out-group', 
non-Muslims, and to protect their uniqueness. For Muslims and non- 
M uslims searching for some safe haven in the ferm ent of moral 
turm oil th a t surrounds us, Islam also has its obvious attractions. 
Once established as a secular religious identity which individuals 
may adopt (or reject) as a solution to their m oral or personal 
problems, Islam may be seen as quite compatible with the prevailing 
discourses in modern W estern society. Yet, one needs to add, 
however, th a t for those born as Muslims who find them selves 
seduced by the freedoms and promise of individual fulfilment th a t 




























































































morality may have the effect of driving a wedge between them  and 
their religion and between them and their orthodox Muslim family.1
For the religion of Islam there is a heavy price to be paid for the 
accommodation to modernity. This is the fragm entation of Islam 
within Islam. The effect is th a t the Muslim identity no longer exists 
as a unified concept. Lawrence Rosen, speaking at the Florence 
Workshop, predicted the emergence of a European version of Islam. 
W hat I am suggesting in this paper is th a t there are likely to be 
several versions. This will leave Muslims free to pick and choose 
between different varian ts of Islam, which reflect, not different 
schools of Koranic exegesis, but ra ther different concessions to 
modernity and different degrees of permissible ind ividuality2. Yet 
th is freedom to choose more or less individualistic versions of a 
Muslim identity simply does not exist within the Islamic religious 
tradition. Every time th a t Muslims take their claims for the right to 
practice their religion or not to be subjected to discrimination before 
the courts or the legislators, a new brick is laid in the construction of 
pluralistic and individualistic Islam. For the traditionalists, each 
legal or political victory for Muslims represents a defeat for the 
religion of Islam.
An alternative solution is for religious Islam in Europe to become 
increasingly closed, insisting upon its own purity and righteousness 
and using obedience to God's law as interpreted by traditional 
exegesis of the Koran and Shari1 ah as the criterion for differentiating 
itself and goodness from the evil of the prevailing social environment. 
While th is may prevent the internal fragm entation of European 
Islam, it would considerably reduce the potential of traditional Islam 
for influencing the external environment, society and other social 
sub-system s, such as law, art, politics, education and economics 
which operate w ithin th a t environment. This would, of course, 
exclude from the religion large numbers of people who 'feel' Muslim 
and for th is reason alone it is unlikely th a t it would prevent the 
fragm entation of Islam in Europe by the construction of non-religious 
versions of Muslim within these non-religious systems. Muslims in
' It might also be argued that, for men at least, the Islamic concept of umnui or 
universal brotherhood also represents a secularized aspect of Islam which has a 
strong attraction in the modern world. However, the collapse of communism, the 
Gulf war which saw Muslim countries fighting on both sides and the increasing 
influence of feminism in America and Western Europe detract considerably from 
its strength.
2 This fragmentation has already occurred in Judaism, where Orthodox. Reform 
and Liberal Jews in the West worship at different synagogues praying from 
different prayer books and offering different interpretations of Jewish laws and 
customs. This has happened quite independently of the differences existing 




























































































Europe would still be compelled to participate in the construction of 
non-religious Muslim identities, which would make it possible for 
them  and others to speak of 'cu ltural M uslims', 'the M uslim  
community', 'Muslim feminism' and 'the rights of Muslims'.
These two paths to increased fragmentation and secularization may 
not be m utually exclusive, but as regards the production of available 
Muslim identities they do represent two distinctive developments. 
The one foresees a 'liberalizing' of religious Islam from within to the 
point where fundamental freedoms, individualism and rationality, as 
conceived by W estern secular discourses, are reconstructed so as to 
make sense w ithin a religious framework of meaning. The other 
constructs an Islamic identity in other spheres than religion.1
1 Neither of these should be confused with Islamic revolutions or the creation of 
Islamic states by fundamentalists, for these seek to expand religious doctrine to 
incorporate all secular institutions and disregard entirely the inherent 
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